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The provisions in the Habitats Directive relating to protection of sites establish a triumvirate 
of decision-makers: administrative authority, scientific advisor, and judiciary. This paper 
examines the relationship between these decision-makers as developed in recent case law, 
both at a European Union (EU) and national level. It argues that reference to the goal of 
environmental protection obscures the allocation of power amongst these actors, and that to 
truly understand the resulting system, we must acknowledge the differing norms which 
motivate each of these actors. In particular, it argues that we must consider the judiciary as an 
actor within the decision-making process, and should examine the role of the principles of 
judicial review and EU law in shaping this. It highlights that there are currently conflicts 
within the process, and that the principles of judicial review cannot provide a successful 
mechanism to manage these conflicts without an explicit consideration of the values ‘hidden’ 
therein.   
 





 the benchmark of European nature conservation law, in 
regulating development of protected sites produces a governance triumvirate. Power is 
                                                 
*
 University Lecturer in Environmental and Property Law, University of Cambridge. Fellow of Fitzwilliam 
College. el38@cam.ac.uk 
1
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divided between public decision-maker, scientific advisor (used generically to refer to those 
providing expert scientific evidence to the decision-maker), and court. To understand this 
interaction we must acknowledge the varying norms shaping each actor’s approach. Recent 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the English and Welsh 
national courts has profound implications for this allocation of decision-making power and 
illuminates the importance of recognising courts as conscious actors within this decision-
making process. These decisions—Sweetman                   ;2 Briels v Minister van 
Infrastructuur en Milieu;
3
 RSPB v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs;
4
 No Adastral New Town Ltd v Suffolk Coastal District Council;
5
 Smyth v Secretary of 
State for Communities and Local Government;
6
 Champion v North Norfolk DC;
7
 and Savage 
v Mansfield District Council
8—focus on the goal of environmental protection.9 By examining 
these recent cases, this article sets out a clear picture of the decision-making process which is 
developing in the courts. It will be seen that in each of these cases, the courts refer to the 
purpose of the Habitats Directive (specifically, the designation of sites for protection therein) 
in terms of the preservation of the conservation objectives of any particular site, such that the 
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overall integrity of both that site and the overall Natura 2000 network are preserved.
10
 In 
highlighting the centrality of this goal, however, the courts in these cases fail to acknowledge 
the conscious or unconscious ‘positioning’ of key stakeholders which thereby emerges at 
various stages of the consent process.
11
 Furthermore, for the English and Welsh courts, this 
‘location’ of decision-making power is obscured (or modulated) by the principles of judicial 
review and the lack of commitment to a particular level of scrutiny in judicial review is 
highlighted by these cases.
12
 By contrast, when considering the CJEU, such modulation 
comes from two competing directions. The first is from the meta-jurisdictional purpose of the 
EU and of the court as an actor within that; and the second is from the principles of 
subsidiarity, supremacy, and the treaty-mandated environmental principles. Surrounding all of 
this are the difficulties of harmonisation, multi-level governance, linguistic complexity and 
ambiguity and, perhaps most importantly, the significant effects of utilising a result-orientated 
approach to the drafting of legal obligations in, what is inevitably, a highly process-driven 
context.  
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The aim of this article is to shine a light on the decision-making picture that emerges, 
and as a result, to illuminate two central outcomes of this recent case law. Firstly, the 
allocation of decision-making power is not the same by the CJEU and the national courts, 
leaving a hidden conflict within the relevant governance structures. This emerges, at least in 
part, because of the different principles motivating the CJEU and national courts and so to 
bring coherence to these decisions we must acknowledge, and account for, these divergences 
of constitutional context. Secondly, the mechanism of judicial review, when carried out in a 
field of scientific uncertainty and complexity in policy, does not provide for a coherent means 
to manage the tensions between EU law and national law. This results in a failure to 
articulate, or even a deliberate obfuscation of, the values that ought to be contested in each 
stage of a decision, and more importantly, as to who adjudges whether those values ought to 
be given weight. It also produces a situation where the most important actor in the process 
appears, often, to be the scientific advisor. Whilst in a perfect world we may well want such 
decisions to be driven by science, the uncertainty therein, and the fact that these decisions are 
often about acceptable risk and balance, rather than simple weighing of evidence, mean that 
hiding behind scientific evidence may undermine the rationality of the eventual decisions 
made.  
This article reaches this conclusion, firstly, by outlining the decision-making process 
under the site protection provisions of the Habitats Directive. In parts three and four, it then 
examines the recent EU and national case law concerning the Directive. In part five, the paper 
considers the relationship between the decision-making processes under the Habitats 
Directive and the principles of judicial review in national law. Similarly, part six examines the 
principles of action for the EU judiciary. This leads to an assessment, in part seven, of the 
nature of the judicial role within the triumvirate of decision-making in the Habitats Directive.  
 
2. Decision-Making Under the Habitats Directive 
The decision-making process giving consent to developments in the UK is a multi-
level one. The preliminary stage is general. That is, local and national planning policy and 
plans are developed so as to produce a picture of generally acceptable and generally 
unacceptable development in each locality. For example, a local plan may state that five 
hundred homes are to be built in a particular area, without specifying the exact site, size of 
homes, etc. The local and national plans are themselves subjected to review on the basis of the 
provisions in the Directive. This process hugely influences the likelihood of a development 
within, or influencing, a protected habitat being given consent. At this stage, the plan-maker, 
in assessing the plan for compliance with the Directive, will take account of scientific 
evidence as to the effects of the proposed general developments within the plan, as well as 
considering the social and economic benefits of so-doing. The scientific assessment and the 
different social and economic values in play will be considered simultaneously in shaping the 
overall plan even though these social and economic values are not explicitly referred to in the 
Habitats Directive. The holistic nature of the decision-making process means that these 
different values will be weighed against each other in formulating the final outcome.  
Where a development is generally acceptable under local and national policy, and that 
local and national policy itself complies with the Directive, the development will then itself 
be assessed as to its effects on the protected site. Again, scientific evidence as to its effect on 
the site, its economic and social value, and other factors will all be taken into account when 
making this assessment. Therefore, since both local and national plans and individual projects 
will be subjected to review under the Directive, both the preliminary stage, and the 
assessment of individual developments, will be assessed in light of article 6(3) and (4). These 
provisions state that: 
3.  Any plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of 
the site but likely to have a significant effect thereon, either individually or in 
combination with other plans or projects, shall be subject to appropriate assessment of 
its implications for the site in view of the site's conservation objectives. In the light of 
the conclusions of the assessment of the implications for the site and subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 4, the competent national authorities shall agree to the plan or 
project only after having ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity of the 
site concerned and, if appropriate, after having obtained the opinion of the general 
public. 
4.  If, in spite of a negative assessment of the implications for the site and in the 
absence of alternative solutions, a plan or project must nevertheless be carried out for 
imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or 
economic nature, the Member State shall take all compensatory measures necessary to 
ensure that the overall coherence of Natura 2000 is protected. It shall inform the 
Commission of the compensatory measures adopted. 
Under this approach many, and most large-scale, developments, will therefore effectively be 
assessed twice: once in the ‘plan-making stage’, and then again in terms of consent for 
specific developments.  
The process which has been developed, through the case law interpretation of these 
provisions of the Directive involves three stages. Firstly, there must be an assessment whether 
the development is ‘likely to have a significant effect’13 on a protected site, either on its own 
or in combination with other existing or planned developments (subject to the ‘first come, 
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first served’ approach14). Unlike the EIA Directive, this initial decision does not require the 
adoption of a formal process. It is not therefore strictly speaking a ‘screening decision’, 
although it is sometimes referred to as such.
15
  
 Secondly, where such significant effects are likely, there must then be an ‘appropriate 
assessment’16 to ascertain whether the development will ‘adversely affect the integrity of the 
site’.17 At this stage, mitigation measures, which are part and parcel of the development (eg 
the creation of parkland within a housing development), can be taken into account to assess 
whether or not there is such an adverse effect of the integrity of the site. The integrity of the 
site is judged according the conservation objectives of the site. 
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Finally, if such an adverse effect is possible, the development cannot be permitted 
unless there are overriding reasons of the public interest,
18
 and only then, if appropriate 
compensatory measures are put in place (such as the creation of substitute habitat 
elsewhere).
19
 If the site is a priority site, a limited range of public interest considerations can 
be taken into account.
20
  
Each of these stages will involve the relevant decision-making authority, scientific 
advisors (Natural England,
21
 but also often a developer’s environmental consultant), and will 
be subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts. Consultation with the public may also 
be appropriate.
22
 At each stage, if it can be shown on the basis of clear, objective, scientific 
evidence, with a high degree of certainty, that there will be no impact on the conservation 
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objectives of the site,
23
 the development can go ahead (at least, in terms of the Habitats 
Directive).  
Described in this way, the process sounds relatively simple, but in practice it can be a 
lengthy and expensive, with projects re-designed throughout to meet the concerns of Natural 
England, the local planning authority, and key stakeholders involved in the project.
24
 Thus, 
from the outset, it must be appreciated that the process is an iterative one: project, evidence, 
and participants shift over time to produce an eventual decision. It is also a costly process, 
and so more guidance on how to produce a decision, and, more importantly, what kinds of 
developments are likely to be successful, is always welcome.
25
 As will be seen below, the 
three-step process outlined above is one which is in fact beset with uncertainty, not in terms 
of the steps which must be taken, but in terms of what precisely the standards to be met are, 
and more fundamentally, as to the role each of these three decision-makers has in the 
outcome. To demonstrate this uncertainty, it is important to examine the recent case law in 
detail.  
 
3. Recent European Case Law 
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3.1 Sweetman v An Bord          26 
The leading case on the Habitats Directive is Waddenzee.
27
 This is not the place to 
repeat the extensive consideration of this case carried out elsewhere.
28
 However, this case sets 
the benchmark for decisions under the Habitats Directive. It establishes a precautionary, 
science-driven, approach to protection of sites,
29
 and highlights that the Directive must be 
interpreted in light of its conservation objectives.
30
 Recent case law however provides more 
detailed guidance on what this general approach means for the specific provisions of the 
Directive. The first case to consider is Sweetman v An Bord         .31 In this case, the ECJ 
provides guidance on the meaning of ‘adversely affect the integrity of the site (ie the second 
stage of the assessment under art 6(3)).
32
 In so-doing, it relies on Waddenzee,
33
 but provides 
further guidance as to the operation of the Directive, and as to what decisions must be made, 
and by whom, in relation to plans or projects in or near protected sites.  
The case was concerned with the planned development of the N6 Galway City Outer 
Bypass road scheme, a scheme which would threaten 1.5 hectares of lime pavement. 
However, this would leave hundreds of hectares of this habitat untouched within the SCI (Site 
of Community Importance – a site proposed to the Commission which may later become a 
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Special Area of Conservation under the Habitats Directive). The question was whether total 
destruction of a very small part of the habitat constituted an adverse effect.  
The ECJ, in line with Waddenzee,
34
 and consistent with its approach to interpretation 
throughout EU environmental law,
35
 adopted a purposive approach to interpretation of the 
relevant provisions. The Court directed that the meaning of art 6 must be ‘construed as a 
coherent whole in the light of the conservation objectives pursued by the Directive’.36 The 
Court therefore held that: 
Authorisation for a plan or project… may therefore be given only on condition that the 
competent authorities - once all aspects of the plan or project have been identified… 
and in the light of the best scientific knowledge in the field - are certain that the plan 
or project will not have lasting adverse effects on the integrity of that site. That is so 
where no reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the absence of such effects.
37
 
The CJEU envisages the courts, relevant authorities, and scientific advisors, as all having 
relevant decisions to make, but furthermore highlights that the assessment should be driven 
by ‘objective’ standards based upon scientific evidence. The Court’s approach leaves little 
room for value-driven interpretation of either the conservation objectives (drafted by the 
relevant national authority, and based, in theory, on purely scientific criteria relating to the 
maintenance of a favourable conservation status on the site), or acceptable levels of risk. Such 
value-driven interpretation would give the courts the ability to take account of the competing 
pressures in relation to a particular area, and would acknowledge the uncertainty in the 
underlying ‘objective’ science. Thus, not only would a value-driven approach allow for an 
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37
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assessment of the merits of the scientific approach, it would allow such merits to be weighed 
against other goals, including, for example, overall environmental improvements. Instead, the 
current approach vests decision-making power in the hands of the scientific advisers, and their 
characterisation of the levels uncertainty present and effectively leaves no room for other 
important considerations in the overall assessment.  
The comments of the court are, however, brief, and more detailed guidance is to be 
found in the opinion of the Advocate General, guidance which the Court cites with approval 
albeit that the Advocate General’s approach in such cases is not binding upon national 
courts.
38
 Advocate General Sharpston deals, in detail, with the process which must be gone 
through in carrying out an assessment under art 6. The Advocate General begins by 
highlighting the importance of the purpose of the Directive in interpreting its provisions.
39
 
The first point of discretion which arises in making this assessment (for discretion it is, 
whether couched in precise scientific terms or not), therefore, is as to the specific 
conservation goals of the site. Although these will be specified at the time of designation,
40
 
the parameters of those goals are inevitably a matter of some fluctuation and are themselves 
subject to interpretation in the assessment process.
41
 Furthermore, the goal is to ensure that 
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the site, and its specific structures and functions in conservation terms are, “likely to continue 
to exist for the foreseeable future”.42 This test is one, which, again, on its face, appears to be 
purely a matter of scientific judgement. However, it is clear that this decision, ie the 
likelihood of site retaining a favourable conservation status, is not susceptible to scientific 
inquiry alone. Rather, it is, in part, a matter of political decision-making in the sense that 
different values, including the desire to protect the environment and the social benefits of 
development must be weighed against each other, when assessing both what is meant by 
likelihood, and how far into the future the ‘foreseeable future’ extends. Thus, even when 
considering the broad purpose of the Habitats Directive, the complexity of the information 
and values which must be accounted for in putting that goal into practice, means that such a 
stage is far from straightforward.  
Having considered the general aim of the Directive, the Advocate General goes on to 
consider the specific purpose of art 6, ie. to, ‘pre-empt damage being done to the site or… to 
minimise the damage’.43 This purposive assessment is backed-up by a linguistic assessment. 
In particular, the French and German versions are contrasted with the English-language 
version of text such that the Advocate General concludes that the English version, and its 
suggestion of a degree of probability, did not meet the phraseology used in other languages.
44
 
Thus, the word ‘likely’ in English is interpreted in the sense of ‘capability’ through reliance 
on both the purpose of the Directive, and its different language versions.
45
 Again, the 
‘possibility’ (as much as the ‘likelihood’) of a plan or project having an effect is not capable 
of being assessed on a purely scientific basis.  Rather some degree of political judgement is 
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also required. Thus simply defining the word ‘likely’ does not, in itself, explain who makes 
the assessment as to whether the test of likelihood is met.  
The Advocate General therefore highlights that not only must scientific expertise be 
taken into account, but that the public should also be invited to give their opinion.
46
 Indeed 
she reasons that, ‘their views may often provide valuable practical insights based on the local 
knowledge of the site in question and other relevant background information that might 
otherwise be unavailable’.47 Therefore, the Advocate General recognises that both expert 
assessment and public engagement are necessary when assessing the likelihood of significant 
effects on the site. However, the Advocate General also makes clear that these contributions 
are merely evidential: it is for the competent national authority to reach their own decision.
48
 
The tensions between decision-maker, advisor, the public, and the courts, are clear. 
Similar guidance is given by the Advocate General in relation to the meaning of 
‘adverse effect on the integrity’ of the site. Following a linguistic assessment, she concludes 
that, ‘the notion of “integrity” must be understood as referring to the continued wholeness and 
soundness of the constitutive characteristics of the site concerned’.49 Again, we see that there 
is significant discretion for the local decision-maker here, but that such discretion is bounded 
within prior-determined assessments as to the meaning of integrity in the form of the 
conservation objectives. An impact will be ‘adverse’ to that integrity when the,  
measures… involve the permanent destruction of a part of the habitat in relation to 
whose existence the site was designated… The conservation objectives of the site are, 
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In assessing the meaning of adverse effects on the site therefore, both the Court, and 
the Advocate General, focus on the purpose of the Directive in general, and the specific 
conservation objectives of the site. In so-doing, they prioritise scientific evidence as the basis 
upon which decisions ought to be made. The Advocate General goes further than the Court, 
and makes a linguistic assessment of the provisions, comparing the different language 
versions in advocating a wide interpretation of the relevant terms. She acknowledges that this 
brings into play more than simply the relevant national authority, and requires the 
engagement of the public and scientific advisors.  
Neither the court, nor the Advocate General, explicitly grapple with the relationship 
between these different actors, and nor do they openly consider the role of the court, leaving 
the precise interaction between the different decision-makers vague, and as can be seen in the 
UK case law below, often unpredictable. As we shall see, this unpredictability is problematic 
in that it causes delays, extra costs, and can indeed hinder the environmental goals of the 
Directive itself. However, what is clear from this case, is that the court sees itself as not 
merely overseer of the reasonableness of decisions made in relation to the Habitats Directive 
and instead accords to itself an active role in policing the interaction between the scientific 
evidence concerning the effects of a development, and the social and economic values which 
have shaped and warranted such a project. Failing to take such an active role would not, in the 
eyes of the court, provide the high level of protection required by the prescriptive goals in the 
Directive. Furthermore, the Court in particular repeats the link it has drawn between 
precaution and scientific evidence, thus determining the way in which scientific evidence and 
the value of environmental protection interact.  
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 3.2 Briels v Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu
51
 
The second case of note is Briels v Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu.
52
 This case also 
concerned a roadway: in this case, the A2 Hertogenbosch-Eindhoven motorway. The plan to 
widen this road would impact upon an SAC—a molinia meadows habitat—due, mainly, to 
increased nitrogen deposits in the area. The CJEU was required to assess whether 
compensatory measures, such as the creation of another area of such habitat in the vicinity, 
meant that it could be concluded that there was no significant adverse effect on the site. Thus, 
the relevant question was: 
[W]hether Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a 
plan or project… which has negative implications for a type of natural habitat present 
thereon and which provides for the creation of an area of equal or greater size of the same 
natural habitat type within the same site, has an effect on the integrity of that site.
53
 
The Court emphasises that we must construe the Directive as ‘a coherent whole’.54 Again, 




The Court concluded that:  
Protective measures provided for in a project which are aimed at compensating for the 
negative effects of the project on a Natura 2000 site cannot be taken into account in 
the assessment of the implications of the project provided for in Article 6(3).
56
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This conclusion is based, not least, on the fact that it is very difficult to predict with accuracy 
the effects of providing new habitats.
57
 The reliance that the Court places on scientific 





 is repeated here: ‘[t]he assessment carried out… cannot have 
lacunae and must contain complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions capable of 
removing all reasonable scientific doubt’.60  
As highlighted above, however, such scientific evidence is unlikely to exist, and at the 
very least discretion remains as to what constitutes reasonable doubt, and, most importantly, 
as to which decision-maker or stakeholder is tasked with assessing whether or not such doubt 
is reasonable. The conclusion that the creation of new habitat should be construed as a 
compensatory measure, is therefore, in part, a conclusion based on the limitations of the 
evidence available. Where such evidence is scant, or uncertain, seeing the creation of new 
habitats as compensatory (rather than mitigation), allows for a more robust and precise 
scientific assessment under art 6(3), with uncertainty, and therefore ‘values’ pushed into 
article 6(4). Furthermore, the approach of the Court shows that the evidence must also be a 
product of scientific consensus: whether such consensus has been reached or not, is however, 
itself a matter of judgment.
61
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Such reliance on scientific evidence, and focus on consensus, or apparent consensus, 
is also to be found in the opinion of Advocate General Sharpston. She argues that, ‘[i]t is 
generally agreed among environmental specialists… that plans or projects likely to have an 
effect on the environment should be assessed in the light of a “mitigation hierarchy”’.62 Thus, 
in deciding which techniques such be considered as falling outside art 6(3) and into article 
6(4), scientific consensus should be relied upon, and ‘value-driven assessment’, again, is seen 
as resting more appropriately in art 6(4).  
From these two recent decisions, we can, therefore, discern three characteristic 
features. Firstly, the Court and the Advocate General both insist that interpretation of the 
Directive should be driven by its purpose (purpose confined to environmental protection), and 
that decisions in relation to individual sites should be driven by maintaining their 
conservation objectives. In doing so, the Courts present this purpose, and these objectives, as 
objectively ascertainable standards which can act as a clear, static benchmark. Secondly, the 
Court indicates that scientific evidence, and particularly scientific consensus, should drive the 
assessment under the Directive. It assumes that both that evidence, and the existence of 
consensus, is, itself, straightforward. However, as Ky has argued, the presence of consensus 
and the interpretation of evidence is itself a value-laden process
63
 and reliance on apparent 
consensus is in itself an exercise in weighing these different values. In focusing on scientific 
evidence in this way, the Court gives little guidance as to who ought to assess whether 
consensus exists, and whether the scientific evidence is sufficiently robust. The values hidden 
in the decision-making process are side-lined, and as a result, decision-making control rests 
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with scientific advisors, even though the nature of the decisions means that they themselves 
will invoke their own judgment to assess acceptable levels of risk Finally, the Court, in 
interpreting the Directive as a ‘coherent’ whole, seems to relegate decisions which are not 
susceptible to a clear scientific answer (even on their own assessment), to being part of art 
6(4). This will affect the types of considerations which are brought into play in art 6(3), thus 
limiting the scope of an administrative authority’s gaze (in terms of the different factors taken 
into account) and therefore, potentially limiting both quality and innovation for 
environmentally beneficial, but seemingly uncertain, developments. Furthermore, it has the 
effect of encouraging developers to design ‘safe’ projects, which will meet the hurdle of art 
6(3) so that no assessment under art 6(4) is required.
64
 However, this may limit the overall 
social and environmental benefits of a development, which may not meet art 6(3), but which 
has such well-designed compensatory measures that overall it may be a “better” development 
than one which can pass simply through art 6(3). This is ironic given that the Directive is 
specifically drafted in such a way as to prioritise the result of environmental protection, rather 
than the procedures designed to achieve that. 
 
4. Recent Case Law of the UK Courts 
A somewhat different approach has often been apparent from the national courts. The 
English and Welsh courts have demonstrated an appreciation (or an acknowledgement) of the 
complexity of decision-making, and the value-assessments that are required, when balancing 
environmental protection against other social goods. The recent decisions discussed here 
demonstrate that trend, albeit one couched in the language of scientific evidence and 
precaution.  
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4.1 Adverse Effect on the Integrity of the Site 
4.1.1 RSPB v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs  
In RSPB v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,
65
 the Court of 
Appeal considered the test to be applied under art 6(3) for ‘adverse effects’ on the integrity of 
the site (the same question as had been addressed in Sweetman
66
). In this case, the site 
concerned an area comprising the Ribble and Alt estuaries, breeding sites for, in particular, 
large gull species. Nearby to the site is a BAE systems aerodrome. Due to the fear of 
‘birdstrike’,67 BAE systems applied, and obtained consent for, a licence to cull. The question 
was whether the cull would adversely affect the integrity of the site.
68
  
The Court of Appeal highlighted, as had the CJEU and the Advocate General in 
Sweetman,
69
 that the test of adverse effects depends upon the conservation objectives of the 
site.
70
 In this particular case, however, at the first stage of the decision-making process in 
relation to the cull, the conservation objectives of the site were unclear.
71
 This lack of clarity 
meant that Natural England was required to draft the objectives of the site with a greater 
degree of precision, before it could be decided whether there was an adverse effect on the 
integrity of the site. The Court acknowledged that the objectives required interpretation, and 
Natural England’s role in this. However, strictly speaking, it was for the Secretary of State to 
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interpret such objectives, and then to assess whether they were adversely affected by the 
cull.
72
 Some guidance is provided as to how to interpret such objectives: 
The… conservation objectives are not enactments, and should not be construed as 
such. However… they mean what they say, and do not mean what the Secretary of 
State, or for that matter, Natural England or the RSPB, might wish that they had said. 
The conservation objectives must be read in a common sense way, and in context.
73
 
In highlighting that the objectives cannot be interpreted as precise, clear, standards, the court 
acknowledges the degree of political judgment present in this kind of question.  
Turning to the specific proposals, the Court concluded that a deliberate drop in 
population numbers did not meet with the objective of maintaining population numbers at 
75% above designation levels, subject to natural change (one of the conservation objectives in 
question).
74
 That this was the correct interpretation of the objectives was made plainer to the 
Court by the fact that this was precisely the interpretation adopted by Natural England itself in 
its comments on the cull.
75
 Thus, despite the acknowledgement of the difficulty of 
interpreting such objectives, the Court returned to the scientific judgment of Natural England. 
The relationship between the Court, Natural England, and the Secretary of State here is 
therefore tangled, and arguably circular one: the Court assesses whether the Secretary of 
State’s decision was reasonable, but reasonableness was assessed here by reference to Natural 
England’s own scientific advice, advice which had been taken into account by the Secretary 
of State.  
 
                                                 
72
 ibid, [19]. 
73
 ibid, [21]. 
74
 ibid, [29] and [31]. 
75
 ibid, [26]-[29]. 
4.2 What Processes are Required when Applying the Habitats Directive? 
4.2.1 No Adastral New Town Ltd v Suffolk Coastal District Council
76
  
In No Adastral New Town,
77
 the Court considered the local council’s Core Strategy (a 
‘plan’ for the purposes of the Directive), and the proposed creation of 2000 new homes near 
the Debden Estuary protected site. There was concern that the increase in housing would 
increase the recreational usage of the site. The Court of Appeal was required to assess two 
issues. Firstly, the question arose as to the timing of the screening assessment for the purposes 
of the Habitats Directive.
78
 Secondly, the question arose as to the extent to which mitigation 
measures should be assessed in detail at an early stage of the development of any plan.
79
 
Thus, this case, and those that follow, are concerned with the issues raised in Briels:
80
 what 
processes must be undertaken in assessing a plan or project in line with the Habitats 
Directive, and where do design features which limit environmental damage fit into this overall 
picture?  
In relation to the first issue, the question was whether a failure to carry out an early 
‘screening assessment’81 (ie to assess whether significant effects to the Special Protection 
Area (SPA - designated under the Wild Birds Directive) were likely
82
) meant that the Council 
could not have explored other options, therefore making the appropriate assessment (as to the 
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adverse effects on the site), inappropriate.
83
 The Court strongly disagreed with this.
84
 
Richards LJ highlighted that the Directive itself does not mention a screening assessment. 
Indeed, it may be so obvious that the plan will affect the SPA in some way or another that 
there is no need to make an initial screening decision to this effect. As Richards LJ reasoned: 
In none of this material do I see even an obligation to carry out a screening 
assessment, let alone any rule as to when it should be carried out. If it is not obvious 
whether a plan or project is likely to have a significant effect on an SPA, it may be 
necessary in practice to carry out a screening assessment in order to ensure that the 
substantive requirements of the Directive are ultimately met. It may be prudent, and 
likely to reduce delay, to carry one out an early stage of the decision-making process. 
There is, however, no obligation to do so.
85
 
Therefore, there is no need to carry out an initial assessment early in the process since the 
whole point of the Directive is simply to avoid damage to the SPA: ‘the language of Article 6 
focuses on the end result of avoiding damage to an SPA and the carrying out of an AA for 
that purpose’.86 However, the Court recognises that there are significant cost and design 
implications for not carrying out an assessment early in the process. Whilst the primary focus 
of the court’s interpretation is therefore in line with the purpose-based approach advocated by 
the CJEU, the national court is aware, if ultimately unmoved, by the potential costs 
advantages of carrying out an article 6(3) assessment early in the process.  
In relation to mitigation measures, the question was whether, in assessing a plan, the 
decision-maker was entitled to leave questions of mitigation measures to individual 
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development assessments.
87
 The Court took a wholly practical approach, focussing not on 
what could be known at the plan-making stages, but what needed to be known, ie whether the 
plan would have an adverse effect on the integrity of the site.
88
 The relevant test was 
therefore: 
[W]hether there was sufficient information at that stage to enable the Council to be 
duly satisfied that the proposed mitigation could be achieved in practice… The 
Council therefore needed to be satisfied as to the achievability of the mitigation in 




Again, the court took a practical approach, but the tone in relation to precaution is somewhat 
different from that adopted by the CJEU which is explicit as to the need for clarity and 
certainty in the relevant evidence base. Whilst this may simply be part and parcel of plan 
assessment (as the individual developments will still themselves require consent), the 
approach is not one demanding scientific certainty in regards to the possibility of the 
development having no adverse effect on the site. The cause of this may also be the different 
norms which the relevant courts consider as being applicable to them however, an issue which 
is discussed in more detail below, but it is significant that the UK courts, focussing on 
process, take a different approach to scientific proof than does the CJEU, which is focused on 
achieving the end goal of environmental protection.  
 
4.2.2 Smyth v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government
90
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Similar questions were asked in Smyth.
91
 Again the main effect to be considered was 
increased recreational usage of the protected site due to more nearby residents. The developer 
proposed to create a public open space so as to mitigate against such effects. Natural England 
had initially advised that not all negative effects on the site would be avoided but changed its 
advice following subsequent policy changes in the local area. Based upon this, the local 
planning authority decided that approval should be given to the development.  
In considering whether the right processes had been applied, the court commenced 





highlighted that a strict precautionary approach should be taken.
94
 However, the scientific 
advice given, and the value judgment entered into by the local authority, were, the Court 
highlights, to be given appropriate weight.
95
 The scientific decision was not the only relevant 
factor.  
However, the Court accepted that mitigation measures can be taken into account under 
art 6(3), as was confirmed in Briels,
96
 and in doing so places much reliance on such scientific 
evidence.
97
 This, when combined with a strict precautionary approach, highlights the 
importance of the way in which Natural England or ecological experts frame their findings in 
terms of both how they label environmental measures (as mitigation or compensation), and in 
and how ‘bold’ they are in terms of their own assessment as to certainty. This is further 
complicated by the potentially ‘strategic’ role that a developer’s expert will play in presenting 
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measures as being mitigation measures rather than as compensation. Furthermore, the 
interaction between this approach, and that taken in relation to the Core Strategy in No 
Adastral Town
98
 above, is complex, since it requires the provision of precise scientific 
information late on in the overall development process. This leaves open the possibility that a 
project must be re-designed to meet the art 6(3) test in such a way that it no longer complies 
with the Core Strategy. This highlights the risks of leaving such assessment late: the flipside 
of this is that early assessment inevitably reduces the value of the scientific evidence of the 
relevant effects on the site due to a lack of detail in the design process at the early stage.  
The cost implications of assessing such mitigation measures, for both developer and 
local authority, were also highlighted by the court. There is a clear desire, both here and in No 
Adastral Town,
99
 to reduce the costs of following procedures in the Habitats Directive. 
However, by leaving detailed assessment to individual development consent, rather than 
considering such detail at the plan-making stage, the risk of substantially higher costs in fact 
increases due to the need to redesign projects already in an advanced planning stage. This is 
however an inevitable consequence of making the assessment an outwardly objective one: in 
order to be sufficiently precise to meet the tests under art 6(3), the scientific evidence relied 
upon must be very clear. To achieve this level of clarity, the development must be in the 
detailed design stage. Thus the risk of high costs, and development stagnation, is a 
consequence of taking a highly precautionary approach which places so much stock on the 
scientific evidence. 
Perhaps the most interesting part of the judgment comes, however, with the discussion 
of the standard of review to be applied by the national court in cases involving the Habitats 
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Directive. As the court acknowledges, decisions under the Directive are, to a certain degree, 
subjective and:  
Although the legal test under each limb of Article 6(3) is a demanding one, requiring a 
strict precautionary approach to be followed, it also clearly requires evaluative 
judgments to be made, having regard to many varied factors and considerations.
100
 
This analysis of the approach to be taken in relation to the scientific evidence is sensible, and 
honest in that it does not pretend that a purely scientific approach to habitats protection is 
possible. It does however interact in a potentially problematic way with the CJEU case law, 
especially when, as discussed, all detailed assessment of the mitigation measures is left to 
individual developments.  
The Court concluded that even though the Habitats Directive is EU in origin, the 
principles of judicial review nevertheless apply to assessments of public authority action.
101
 
This takes away some control of decision-making from the courts and confers it onto the local 
authority by limiting the court to overseer, rather than allowing for merits review. This is in 
contrast, at least in tone, to the CJEU, where issues such as the robustness of scientific 
evidence in the context of the precautionary principle are seen as being matters for fresh 
assessment by the reviewing court. In short, the layers of decision-making power, of detail in 
assessment, and of control, are highly complex in Smyth.
102
 The decision oscillates between 
relying on scientific evidence, and acknowledging the political values that must be taken into 
account. This oscillation however is understandable in a system of multi-level governance 
where there is a clash of legal principle. 
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4.2.3 Champion v North Norfolk DC
103
 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Champion v North Norfolk DC,
104
 demonstrates 
the different approach that the national courts are taking to the Habitats Directive and the 
procedures involved despite the fact that Lord Carnwath is very explicit that he is following 
the European Court (and not, where there is divergence, the Advocate General).
105
 In this 
case, the question was whether, in cases where it is clear that there is going to be either no 
likely significant effect, or no adverse effect on the integrity of the site, it is nevertheless 
necessary to go through the ‘first stage’ of the decision-making process to ascertain formally 
whether there is no likely significant effect, or whether it is possible simply to conclude that 
there is no adverse effect.
106
 This is an important issue since if an initial assessment is 
required, it may be that information about the potential environmental effects of a project 
comes to light that may not if no process has to be carried out in ‘clear-cut’ cases.  
The Supreme Court concluded that the Habitats Directive (unlike the EIA Directive) is 
about substance, not form, and that as long as the relevant tests in art 6(3) are in fact met, the 
lack of a specific procedure to ensure this will not result in a flawed decision.
107
 This means, 
for example, that there is no need, under the Habitats Directive, to have public consultation. 
The processes can be carried out on a purely scientific and technical basis,
108
 but without any 
assessment, it is impossible to see how the scientific evidence could meet the standard of 
robust consensus required by Waddenzee.
109
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 4.3 Scientific Advice 
4.3.1 Savage v Mansfield DC
110
 
The final case to examine is Savage v Mansfield DC,
111
 another decision of the Court 
of Appeal. The appeal concerned a 169 hectare development, to the south of which was a Site 
of Special Scientific Interest, which was not, but which may have been, a potential Special 
Protection Area (pSPA). Following the decision in Commission v Spain,
112
 this meant that the 
site had to be given the same protection as if it had already been designated if it was indeed a 
pSPA. In consultation with Natural England, the local authority had requested information as 
to whether or not the site was a potential SPA. Natural England’s response was that it was not 
such a site, but that they could not guarantee it would not become so, and that as such it 
would be preferable for the local authority to consider the consequences of designation 
anyway. They confirmed that the measures which the developer had proposed to put in place 
would, in their view, likely be insufficient if the site were to be designated.  
 The first question for the Court was whether a failure to follow this advice was 
problematic since it would involve the local authority departing from the advice of the 
statutory scientific advisor specifically tasked with protection of habitats.
113
 This required 
some assessment as to the status of Natural England’s advice.114 Lewison LJ reasoned that: 
In the case of a pSPA the planning authority must consult Natural England and (I 
assume) must conduct a habitat assessment. But a site only becomes a pSPA one the 
government has initiated consultation. That has not happened in the case of Sherwood 
                                                 
110
 Savage (n 8). 
111
 ibid.  
112
 C-355/90 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain [1993] ECR I-4221. 
113
 Savage (n 8), [39]. 
114
 ibid, [39]. 
Forest. It follows in my judgment that the Council had no obligation to consult Natural 
England... 
No doubt Natural England had the power to give advice to the Council… and no doubt 
that advice, coming as it did from an expert body, would have been a material 
consideration. But I do not consider that it goes any further than that.
115
 
In other words, where there is no legal obligation to obtain advice from the expert body, 
whilst that advice would be a material consideration, there is no obligation to follow it. This is 
an approach which fully reflects the principles of judicial review in that ultimately the 
decision-maker power (rather than advisory or reviewing power) rests with the administrative 
authority. As the Court highlights, ‘[a]n attack based on an allegation that the Council gave 
too little weight to advice received from one particular source is almost bound to fail’,116 at 
least where the reviewing standard is one of Wednesbury unreasonableness.
117
 This approach, 
by its very nature, cannot assure that a particular outcome is reached (ie the goal of 
environmental protection), but considers instead process and reasonableness.  
Finally, the Court considers what the local authority ought to have done in this 
circumstance, even if it did follow Natural England’s advice to take a ‘risk-based approach’118 
(the risk being the risk of designation of the site). The Court was unimpressed with the 
argument that this would require the local authority to do as Natural England advised: 
I found it very difficult to understand precisely what more the Council was supposed 
to do, even if it had followed Natural England’s advice… If all that the “risk based 
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assessment” was to do was to incorporate Natural England’s suggestion of a 400 metre 
buffer zone, that would not have required any further assessment. All it would have 
required was the adoption of that suggestion.
119
 
The court here is clear in highlighting that the measures which must be adopted to prevent 
effects on the protected site, and the potential success of such measures, are matters for the 
local authority, not for Natural England. Furthermore, the approach is one which makes no 
reference to precaution: the uncertainty as to the success of the proposed measures, and the 
need to comply fully with Natural England’s advice if all scientific doubt is to be eliminated, 
are not addressed. 
Thus, from the approach of the English courts, as with the European Court, we can see 
the emergence of key threads in the reasoning. Unlike the European Court however, the 
approach oscillates: the English courts waver between relying on a strict precautionary 
approach, and on the judicial review principles which require them to leave matters of 
judgement and value to an administrative decision-maker (in this case, local planning 
authorities). We see therefore, firstly, a clear desire to leave matters of interpretation of 
evidence, and of responsibility, to the relevant authority. This extends, in some cases, to the 
courts relying on local authority interpretation of both conservation objectives, and the 
scientific evidence in the case. Secondly, there is also a clear recognition by the English 
courts that the cost and complexity of the planning permission process in general are factors 
which ought to be taken into account when reviewing decision-making by local authorities.
120
 
A practical approach is adopted. In this context however, at the very least, following a settled 
procedure allows for the early redesigning of projects where such produces a better outcome 
in the long-run. Finally, the court makes all of these assessments on the basis of judicial 
review principles, leaving decisions to be reasonable or unreasonable, rather than right or 
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wrong, notwithstanding the European origin of the relevant rules, but the precise standard of 
judicial review to be applied is unclear. 
It would overstate the position to say that there is a direct conflict between the CJEU 
and the national courts here: the characteristic decision-making styles of the different courts 
mean that there is no direct clash. What there is however is a different underlying approach to 
two central issues: the locus of decision-making power, and the treatment of scientific advice/ 
evidence. These themes will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
5. Decision-Making Allocation and the Principles of Judicial Review 
What this review of the case law demonstrates is that whilst there is beginning to 
emerge a practical consensus as to how the Habitats Directive should operate, in general, the 
specific powers under the Directive remain hazy. The procedural steps that the local decision-
maker must take are clear. What is less clear, however, is what the substance of that decision 
ought to be, and most importantly, where discretion lies in making such decisions. This is 
partly a result of the different roles of the UK and European Court: the CJEU seeks, as do the 
EU provisions, to achieve the outcome of environmental protection; the UK courts are more 
concerned about the procedural steps needed to achieve this end. However, without 
recognising this imbalance, the fuzziness which emerges in linking goal and process will 
continue. Indeed, the lack of clarity as to where discretion lies, and how that discretion is 
controlled, contributes to a lack of clarity over what is meant by the key terms in the 
Directive, such as ‘likely’, ‘integrity’, and ‘significant’.121 Whilst some guidance has been 
provided—‘likely’ is akin to ‘possible’;122 ‘significant’ means, in effect, any impact at all that 
                                                 
121
 Lees (n 9), 75-93. 
122
 Sweetman (n 2).  
exceeds a de minimis threshold;
123
 and “integrity” is a function of the conservation objectives 
of the site
124—without a thorough examination of the discretionary elements of these tests, the 
locus of decision-making power is obscured. The content of decisions is thereby rendered 
unpredictable. But this discretion, and therefore this unpredictability, goes beyond discretion 
in interpretation. Rather, the discretion exists in the drafting of the conservation objectives; 
the interpretation of the relevant scientific evidence; the relationship between the statutory 
terms and the factual context for each individual decision; and the justifications for the 
development. 
The downsides of such unpredictability, resulting in delays to the decision-making 
process due to the need for lengthy judicial consideration, are expressed with some force by 
Lord Carnwath in Champion,
125
 when he highlights that: 
Although this development gave rise to proper environmental objections, which 
needed to be resolved, it also had support from those who welcomed its potential 
contribution to the economy of the area. It is unfortunate that those benefits have been 
delayed now for more than four years since those objections were… fully resolved.126 
This is a repetition of similar guidance given in 2003 in relation to the EIA Directive.
127
 Over 
ten years on, it is unfortunate that uncertainty caused by discretion, the drawn-out nature of 
litigation, and the lack of clarity of the substantive content of decisions, is hindering both 
environmental protection and economic growth and development.
128
 Whether or not 
development is desirable is a separate question from whether an appropriate barrier to such 
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development is lengthy, costly processes which are unpredictable. It may not be the place of 
the courts to assess such overall benefits, but it would be regrettable if the judicial approach 
prevented a wider consideration the overall ‘sustainability’ of a project simply because 
uncertainty in the relevant legal obligations were to engender unwarranted caution. To take 
steps to remedy this, in addition to interpretive approaches being more ‘considerate’ of the 
users of legislation like the Habitats Directive,
129
 we also need to be clear as to who makes 
key decisions, what factors can influence them, and how these decisions are controlled. To 
achieve this, we need to acknowledge that no such certainty can be achieved without an open 
consideration the principles of action motivating the different courts, and therefore of how the 
principles of judicial review interact with EU principles, including, but most not limited to, 
the precautionary principle. 
To address this therefore, it is necessary to commence with some analysis of how 
judicial review operates in relation to the Habitats Directive. In the following section the 
principles constraining decisions of the CJEU will be examined. In relation to judicial review, 
there are two areas of uncertainty: firstly, what is the distinction between questions of fact and 
questions of law in the environmental context; and secondly, what level of scrutiny is used in 
judicial review here.  
The fact/law distinction is problematic, both as a predictable tool for allocating 
decision-making power, and as an appropriate tool for so-doing.
130
 It is a distinction designed 
to perform two roles in controlling public decision-making, two roles which do not often sit 
comfortably side by side. Firstly, it must assist in interpretation of statutory provisions. 
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Questions of law within a statute (sometimes referred to questions to which there can be only 
one right answer: ‘a question of application of statutory language is a question of law when 
the law requires one answer to it’ 131 ) are matters for interpretation by the courts. The 
interpretation given forms the ratio of the case, giving it the force of precedent. Thus, the 
meaning of a key term within a statute is a question of law. The courts will review this on a 
correctness basis, ie they will determine whether a term has been correctly interpreted by a 
decision-maker, rather than assessing whether that decision-maker has adopted a reasonable 
interpretation of the term, and will rely on previous judicial decisions to assist in doing so. 
Questions of fact in interpretation, by contrast, are generally terms for factual assessment by 
the administrative authority. 
Secondly, the distinction is also used to control decision-making beyond questions of 
interpretation. However, to attempt to distinguish such decisions in this way is problematic, 
particularly in the environmental field, where statutory terms themselves are often value-
based. For example, assessing meaning of the term ‘significant’ is interpretation of the statute 
and is, therefore, a question of law. Whether or not the facts in front of the public decision-
maker demonstrate such significance, is a question of fact. However, it is not possible to 
assess what ‘significant’ means without some engagement with the context, and with the 
principles and justifications underpinning the statutory provision.
132
 Thus, judicial attempts to 
ascertain the meaning of the word ‘significant’ in the statutory provision (leaving the question 
as to whether the meaning is met in the facts) become problematic, and the courts, reluctant to 
overstep their proper role, treat the meaning of the word as a question of fact, subject to a 
range of meanings depending upon context. The most pertinent use of the notion of questions 
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of law is therefore to distribute decision-making power and responsibility since it becomes 
itself a value assessment as to whether to label a decision one of law or fact. It is thus, ‘the 
standard device that common law systems have used to order relations between two decision-
makers’.133 
Therefore, whilst this distinction is both comprehensible, and seemingly useful, in 
theory, the difficulty emerges, a difficulty particularly prevalent in environmental law, where 
the ascertaining of facts is a matter of value assessment, as well as legal or scientific 
precision, and where the meaning of key terms used within the statutory provisions cannot be 
understood without engagement with the facts. The meaning of terms such as ‘likely’, and 
‘significant’, whilst definable in the abstract, require much extrapolation to apply to a 
particular fact scenario. The question emerges therefore, which of the stakeholders is 
responsible for this abstraction and how stringent the court will be in ascertaining whether 
this has been carried out in an appropriate way by the decision-maker. This either conscious 
or unconscious manipulation of the fact/law distinction is therefore one technique for 
allocation of power which can be derived from the principles of judicial review. This 
modulates the power balance struck on a ‘straight’ reading of the legislative provisions, since 
a court can either call power to itself by making the terms within arts 6(3) and 6(4) matters of 
law, or they can defer to the local authority by considering them as questions of fact. 
Furthermore, an additional modulation of the power structures put in place by the 
Habitats Directive can be achieved through reliance on a variable, fluctuating standard of 
judicial review. The impact that the approach a court takes to judicial review can have on the 
way decisions are made is summarised by Edwards. In considering the US Supreme Court in 
Chevron,
134
 he argues that: 
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First, where the statutory language or intent is clear, judicial review is available to 
ensure that the decision-maker has complied with the law. The test of the lawfulness 
of the challenged decision in this case is ‘correctness’ and no deference is called for. It 
is for the court to say what the law means. But where the statute is silent on the 
particular matter, of the statutory language is ambiguous or has left a lacuna, judicial 
review is limited. Deference is the watchword: only if the decision-maker has come to 
what a British lawyer would essentially understand as a Wednesbury unreasonable 
decision on the meaning or intendment of the statute, should the court intervene.
135
  
He highlights that in the UK, and in particular in relation to environmental law, which of 
these approaches should be adopted—correctness review, or reasonableness assessment—is 
unclear.
136
 Thus, ‘we still do not have an established doctrine on the intensity of judicial 
review’.137 This is an ambiguity which is clear from the case law above where, for example, 
the national decisions demonstrate flexibility in the degree to which the administrative 
authority should feel bound by scientific advice. The outcome of this, as Edwards highlights, 
is that ‘the courts’ approach to the intensity of judicial review is unsystematic, lacks 
coherence, and importantly from litigants’ and their advisors’ point of view, is not 
predictable’.138 However, it is suggested here that there is a further important consequence: by 
failing to grapple with the question as to the intensity of judicial review, we further fail to 
examine who should be making the relevant decision and why, and how the various principles 
which each body relies upon in making its decisions should be balanced. This, as Fisher has 
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highlighted, is made especially difficult where the precautionary principle is one of those 
principles which must be factored into the process.
139
  
These distinctions however only relate to one potential power division—that between 
the courts and the public authority. There are more layers in the Habitats Directive. The 
relationship between Natural England and a local decision-maker is also one where the 
different levels of expertise of these bodies ‘pushes’ power into the hands of Natural England. 
However, the degree to which the local authority should rely on the advice of Natural England 
is a matter for the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, requiring the courts to assess the 
reasonableness of Natural England’s advice. Furthermore, where an EIA is required in 
addition to assessment under the Habitats Directive, the public consultation elements of the 
procedure will add an additional voice. How much weight is and must be given to this voice 
in the final decision will also shift the locus of decision-making power. Simply stating that 
‘adverse effect on the integrity’ relates to the conservation objectives tells us nothing about 
how these different voices should be balanced against one another, and whether it is the court, 
or the public authority, that ought to assess this balance.  
This triumvirate: science, politics and democracy, and the judiciary—forms the axes 
within which decisions on habitats’ protection are located. To find a comfortable balance 
between them however, context is extremely important, as are the different principles of 
actions which dictate how each body behaves. Indeed, as will be argued below, one of the 
primary ways of reconciling these relationships comes from recognising the judiciary as 
independent actor, driven by its own culture of decision-making. In relation to UK courts, part 
of this culture is the culture of judicial review. By turning a light onto the principles of 
judicial review, we start to examine how the ‘points on the axes’ are selected. However, the 
variability shown by the courts in how to utilise the principles of judicial review, and the 
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inherent vagueness in such principles, especially when addressing the discretion of local 
authorities, is made particularly difficult when the question is the amount of weight given to 
the advice of Natural England, and in assessing whether that advice is the product of a robust 
scientific consensus. The precautionary approach mandated by the ECJ makes this even more 
problematic.  
 
6. Principles of EU Law: Subsidiarity, and Harmonisation and the Environmental Principles 
Thus, the UK courts are limited and controlled in their approach by the principles of 
judicial review—principles which reach beyond environmental law and are, for the most part, 
shaped in a different context. Similarly, the CJEU is governed by different limits to its own 
decision-making power. It is limited by the scope of the preliminary reference procedure,
140
 
and by the unique foundations that make up the Union legal system, both supreme over, and 
subsidiary, to, national law. Furthermore, the CJEU must also take account of the meta-
principles of the Union,
141
 principles which, although often side-lined in an environmental 
context in favour of the environmental principles,
142
 nevertheless constrain what the Union 
can and should be attempting to achieve. When considering the role of the CJEU when 
compared with the national court, we must also be aware of the constitutional position within 
which that European court finds itself, and the principles which dictate its actions. This 
consideration must step beyond the principles of environmental law, and must instead 
encompass the principles of EU law as a whole. In particular, the principles of subsidiarity 
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(and the governance structures which this attempts to encapsulate), and the goal of 
harmonisation must also be accounted for.  
The principle of subsidiarity, contained within art 5(3) expresses the idea that the EU 
should only intervene in an area where action on this matter can be best achieved at a EU, 
rather than a national or regional level.
143
 This expresses a general principle, albeit obliquely, 
that local action is, generally speaking, to be preferred to national or international action on a 
matter. Subsidiarity as a meta-principle requires that the CJEU achieve two objectives by way 
of its decision-making: deference to local decision-makers where expertise demands; and a 
clear articulation of the need for European-wide action to justify CJEU control. The 
combination of these two factors results in a necessary ‘broad’ approach to decisions in 
relation to habitats’ protection. Where a decision is too narrow—focusing on the individual 
case, as would, for example, a UK common law court—the court highlights that it is not best 
placed to make the relevant decision beyond a restatement of the provisions of the Directive. 
Thus a ‘broad’ approach is adopted, but the outcome is guidance which is vague and 
unhelpful.  
It is at this juncture that we can recognise how the other meta-principle of the Union, 
harmonisation, becomes relevant, since it provides the justification for the broad approach 
which allocates power to the Union decision-making organs (rather than the national or local 
decision-maker). Thus, if the two principles are combined, subsidiarity as a background 
principle demands that where local context is all, the decision should be made at a local level. 
To justify its own intervention on these grounds therefore, the CJEU is directed to make its 
comments, and its approach, relevant to the wider EU picture rather than seeing the decision 
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as confined to a local or national dimension. This brings the goal of harmonisation into the 
picture. When this is added to the environmental principles, as discussed below, the 
constitutional place of the CJEU results in broad and vague decisions which very often 
provide less precise guidance than might be desired precisely because doing so would 
overstep the subsidiarity principle and limit the decisions’ contribution to the overall goal of 
harmonisation.  
The environmental principles, and in particular, the precautionary principle, obviously 
too have a role to play in policing decisions in this area. Whilst the principles are supposed to 
direct all of the actors in the process—including the scientific advisors—they are particularly 
relevant for the court in judging whether a decision make by a local authority strays beyond 
an acceptable level of risk. What these principles also do, however, is turn the focus of 
decisions in this area onto environmental protection, to the detriment of the other necessary 
values, such as natural justice and equality.
144
 Whilst this is understandable—the pressures of 
rapid habitats’ deterioration, combined with Union goals for enhanced biodiversity in Europe 
by 2020,
145
 mean that action is both urgent, and a high priority—it results in a side-lining (at 
least in explicit terms) of the other meta-principles of the Union so that their influence is left 
hidden or, in some cases, overlooked altogether (we can see this in relation to the Union-wide 
principle of legal certainty)
146
.  
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Thus the environmental principles and their premise that environmental protection is 
justified, is taken beyond this point to the point where environmental protection is not only 
justified, it is the only justifiable solution to an environmental problem, whether this is to the 
detriment of certainty, subsidiarity and the prioritisation of local decision-making, or to the 
relationship of the national and European courts.  
 
7. The Judiciary as Actor in the Decision-Making Process  
This analysis has demonstrated that whilst the recent decisions of national and EU 
courts have clarified the processes that must take place in relation to art 6 of the Habitats 
Directive, what is still less than clear is where the locus of power rests for decision-making 
under its provisions. This lack of clarity is the product of the context within which the various 
courts operate. It is furthermore the product of the different goals of the legislative 
interventions in question: the Habitats Directive itself aims to prevent damage, the UK 
legislation establishes the process by which such damage is prevented. This different 
legislative context itself results in tensions in the appropriate judicial role. The most important 
conflict of power however is between the local authority and the courts, and the shape of 
judicial review principles does nothing to clarify this further, especially where the alternative 
approach pursued by the CJEU adds an additional layer of norms within which each court 
must operate.  
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Distinguishing between questions of fact and law, and relying on the concepts of 
procedural fairness and reasonableness, do not determine who decides which questions are a 
matter for the discretion of a local authority, the precision of the courts, or indeed for the 
scientific judgement of Natural England
147
 or other expert bodies. This tripartite tension 
cannot be resolved either by further pursuing questions of the standard of judicial review, nor 
by considering principles of decision-making in environmental law, such as the precautionary 
principle, in isolation. Rather, to reconcile these difficulties, focus is required as to the unique 
role which each actor plays in this process, and, most importantly, the principles which dictate 
the action of each. It is only by understanding the rationale of their approach that we can 
reconcile such approaches.  
Thus, the English courts are motivated by the principles underpinning judicial review: 
a desire to supervise the exercise of public power in such a way which does not substitute 
judicial for political decision-making, but which gives all actors a fair hearing and which 
demands reasonableness, clear processes, and the consideration of all relevant information. 
By contrast, the local decision-maker is motivated not to comply with the legal principles per 
se, nor, unlike Natural England, is it tasked with protecting the environment, rather, it ought 
to comply with the principles laid down in local and national policy recognising legitimate 
risk taking, the social and economics benefits of developments, and the national and local 
interest in protection of the environment. Such decision-makers are therefore motivated by 
balancing such varied and complex issues in a policy-focused way. Finally, Natural England 
is constrained by the goal of environmental protection, and most importantly by the principles 
of scientific decision-making, of robustness in method and evidence, and by the search for 
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consensus (incorporating precaution into these approaches). Similar comments can be made 
about the constitutionally-mandated goals dictating the approach of the CJEU. Their focus on 
subsidiarity, harmonisation, and the environmental principles, produces a distinctive style of 
response to questions of habitats’ protection, one which is often at odds with that pursued at a 
national level. Furthermore, the ‘goal-orientated’ approach of the EU legislature, and 
European Court, encourages the CJEU to take a different approach to reasoning about the 
legal process than does the UK legislation for national courts. 
This is in fact symptomatic of a wider tension present in the EU/ national law 
relationship, that represented by fundamentally different approaches to governance in a public 
law context. The EU approach is often one which demands a particular outcome, but leaves 
discretion as to process. This is, in essence, the very nature of the Directive. By contrast, or 
perhaps as a result of this, much national legislation which implements EU law does so from a 
process-orientated focus, and seeks to manipulate the approach of the administrative authority 
given the task of implementation, rather than seeking to demand a particular outcome. Once 
this is twinned with the judicial review principles in a UK context, and the “hands-off” 
approach this can represent in relation to administrative decision-making, it is perhaps 
inevitable that conflict emerges. 
The purpose of this article has not been to demonstrate where power should lie, nor 
indeed, to show that it lies in any one place in any one decision. Rather, it has attempted to 
show that the case law is inconsistent on this point, and that, crucially, the European Court 
and the national courts appear to have diverged in terms of what they consider to be the 
appropriate role of a court in this area. What all the courts implicitly acknowledge, however, 
is that the judiciary is a unique voice within the habitats’ protection systems, and should be 
treated as such. The courts are not able to mechanically apply the provisions to the facts 
before them: instead they will exercise discretion both in interpreting the provisions within 
the regimes, and in considering whether a particular plan or project should have been 
authorised for development. How this discretion is exercised, and the principles upon which it 
takes place, are, as has been shown, sometimes unhelpful in this context. The principles of 
limitations of judicial power—deference, judicial review—do not helpfully operate within a 
system which relies so heavily on scientific information and where precaution is the 
appropriate standard. Furthermore, the environmental principles, in driving broader 
interpretation of statutory provisions, and causing a single-minded focus on protection of the 
environment, fail to engage with the wider questions raised by the Habitats Directive: 
questions of value, democratic judgment and risk.  
Whilst the courts are not necessarily best-placed to answer these questions, what these 
cases do is shine a light on the role of the court, and require us to consider more fully what we 
want to use the judiciary for in an environmental protection context. It is argued here, that the 
judiciary should be assigned roles which best accord with their skills, training, and expertise. 
This means that they are neither well-equipped to review scientific evidence, nor do they have 
the legitimacy to make political judgment about balance of values within any particular local 
area. As Fisher, Pascual and Wagner note, this is not a grounds of criticism for the courts, it is 
both to be desired and is inherent in the nature of these different decision-makers: 
Legal tests of validity are generated from judicial-review doctrines and legal 
interpretations of legislation (grounded in legal precedents concerning the approach to 
legislation). Scientific tests of robustness will also be grounded on an understanding of 
the legislative mandate but will be primarily drawn from understandings of good 
scientific practice as understood in a wider scientific community.
148
  
What this means however is that we ought to recognise the role of the court in shaping 
processes, without conferring on them scientific decision-making responsibility. Thus, what 
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the courts are able to do is produce a body of case law, as is beginning to emerge in relation to 
the Habitats Directive, which, in a step-by-step and incremental fashion, utilises the common 
law method to clarify, provide consistency, and to build up a corpus of decisions which form 
the bedrock of the process moving forward. Thus, in seeing their role as promoters of the rule 
of law, the courts do, and should, prioritise the production of such a set of case law. This will 
carve out for them a unique presence within the decision-making process, rather than placing 
them as rivals to local authorities.  
In a national context this will mean embracing, rather than shunning, the virtues of the 
common law as a means by which statutory terms are given precision over time through the 
development of, and reliance on, well-established common law principles.
149
 This will require 
engagement with more than the environmental principles. Indeed, it requires us to ask: what 
values ought a court to take into account when exercising its decision-making capabilities, 
and, even in an environmental context, do these go beyond or differ from, those values that 
we wish a public authority to take into account. It is argued here, that to think that these 
bodies should and do take account of the same values is unrealistic, and indeed, counter-
productive. Rather, each should take account of the values unique to their own system, whilst 
also engaging with the values common to all. This is where the importance of the judicial 
review principles emerge, but judicial review does not provide a sufficiently nuanced picture 
where the governance relationships are as complex as they are in relation to habitats.  
How do we resolve the tensions which emerge from the recent case law examined 
here? The first step to resolving the tensions is to acknowledge openly the difficulty of the 
interaction between the principles of judicial review expressed in English law (which, 
themselves, are contested in their use in relation to the terms used in the Directive), and the 
principles of EU law. Secondly, we must be open that the principles of EU law which are 
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relevant here go beyond the precautionary principle, and indeed the environmental principles 
as a whole. They extend to include the meta-principles of the Union, including a drive to 
ensure harmonisation of economic standards across the union, subsidiarity, and the principles 
of legal certainty which operate at Union level. These additional principles must be taken 
account of if we are to build a rich and open framework for allocating decision-making power 
within the Habitats Directive. Finally, we must recognise that the scientific evidence which 
forms the ‘background’ to many of these decisions is itself a product of both value-
judgement, and the Habitats process which have been developed through the case law. Fisher, 
Pascual and Wagner note the beneficial development of approaches which recognise the 
benefits of open dialogue between such decision-makers, arguing that,  
In overseeing scientific challenges, the courts appear to serve as a necessary irritant, 
encouraging the agency to develop much stronger administrative governance and 
deliberative decisions on complex science-policy issues. Conversely, in developing 
stronger decision- making processes, the resulting agency efforts have a reciprocal, 
positive impact on the courts’ own standards for review. The courts and agencies thus 
appear to work symbiotically through their mutual efforts on the establishment of 
rigorous analytical yardsticks to guide the decision process.
150
 
It is only by openly considering how these constitutional controls operate together than we 
can build up a clear, considered, and coherent approach to the triumvirate of decision-making 
power in relation to habitats: court, local decision-making, scientific advisor.  
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